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What Makes the Anthropology of
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2 University of Chicago

The study of policy, therefore, leads straight into issues at
the heart of anthropology: norms and institutions; ideology
and consciousness; knowledge and power; rhetoric and discourse; meaning and interpretations; the global and the local — to mention but a few.
(Shore and Wright, 1997: 4)

As sociocultural theorists (e.g., Gutierrez and Rogoff, 2003; Orellana,
2009) have recently asserted, “culture” is something one does, rather
than something one has. That is, human beings produce, perform, and
reproduce culture every day. Policy implementation — or what Milbrey
McLaughlin (1987: 175) has called “muddling through” — is deeply
implicated in these processes of cultural production and thus invites
anthropological inquiry. Indeed, it is possible to link the study of policy implementation to some of the foundational efforts of anthropology, particularly cultural anthropology (Wedel et at., 2005). Our discussion in this chapter thus borrows explicitly and centrally from an
Published in A Companion to the Anthropology of Education, First Edition. Edited by Bradley A. U. Levinson and Mica Pollock (Blackwell Publishing, 2011), pp 461–477.
Copyright © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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early, classic cultural anthropology work (Malinowski, 1922), while
also drawing on more recent research, to explain the distinctive characteristics of the anthropological study of policy implementation and
its foundational analytic categories and concerns.
In 1984, Frederick Erickson updated and republished an essay titled, “What Makes School Ethnography ‘Ethnographic’?,” which was
initially published in 1973. Both versions built centrally from Malinowski. Although “anthropological” and “ethnographic” are overlapping rather than synonymous terms, as are “school” and “educational
policy implementation,” Erickson’s (1984) essay provides a highly useful template for our current endeavor. Its usefulness derives not only
from his demonstration of how classical anthropological concepts can
be applied to the study of education, but also because its very structure
can be imitated here with the same questions posed about educational
policy implementation that Erickson posed about the ethnography of
schools. Erickson’s chapter, however, is not as explicit about another
concern — validity — so for consideration of that we also turn later in
the paper to other sources, particularly Maxwell (1992).
Like Erickson (1984), we are writing at a time when the subfield
we are describing — in our case, educational policy implementation
studies — is becoming increasingly well-established (see Datnow and
Park, 2009; Honig, 2006; McLaughlin, 1987) and drawing many of its
core methods and assumptions from anthropology, but not always acknowledging those roots explicitly (e.g., Stein, 2004). Whether its anthropological components are overtly recognized or not, the subfield
of educational policy implementation studies differs from the traditionally dominant field of educational policy studies. Thus, a modest
purpose of this chapter is to clarity the anthropological components
of educational policy implementation studies, but a larger one is to
clarity how such inquiry differs more substantially from the dominant
strains of educational policy research. Recently, Erickson and Gutierrez wrote, “A logically and empirically prior question to ‘Did it work?’
is ‘What was the “it”?’ — ‘What was the “treatment” as actually delivered?’” (2002: 21). Studying the “it” as well as the outcomes (instead
of outcomes only) is not the only distinction between anthropological
education policy implementation studies and traditional educational
policy studies, but it is an important one, and one that we return to
throughout this chapter.
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Like Erickson (1984), we face the task of adapting the original impulses of our discipline — to document cultures — for different purposes. However, unlike that historic (and subsequently critiqued) impulse of documenting a people who supposedly existed in a bounded,
coherent, and relatively homogeneous collective, anthropological studies of education policy implementation cannot presume a single people or type as their target. Instead, they necessarily include explaining
the heterogeneous bases for the interaction of diverse peoples through
policy implementation. Policy implementation links people who often
are obviously quite different from each other in terms of age, formal
preparation, expected agency (as subject or object of implementation),
location, and formal position, but who nonetheless are connected to
one another as part of a web or network of social activity focused on:
(1) defining (or contesting others’ definitions of) what is problematic
in education; (2) promoting or resisting particular strategies for responding to such purported problems; and (3) determining to what
vision of the future change efforts should be directed.
As with the 1970s and 1980s (the two dates of Erickson’s publication), ours is also a time when anthropologists of education are
far more likely to be housed in faculties of education than in anthropology. Peripheral then to its disciplinary home in anthropology (although consistent with the anthropology of policy more generally (e.g.,
Shore and Wright, 1997; Wedel et al., 2005)), the anthropology of educational policy implementation must compete with the dominant paradigm for policy research in education. As Levinson and Sutton assert
(2001), this dominant paradigm, which we refer to as the “technicalrational approach,” takes a narrower, more formal, and primarily instrumental view of policy; it assumes a neat distinction between policy and practice and often a linear, unidirectional relationship between
them; it attempts to apply positivistic principles and methods from the
natural sciences to explain and predict educational policy processes;
it takes for granted received categories (such as “academic achievement” or “English language learner”); and it seeks certain actionable
truths embodied in purportedly value-free scientific studies.
As we shall see, anthropological studies of educational policy implementation, by contrast, define policy itself much more broadly, and
consequently include a broader range of social actors in their analyses; they problematize clean distinctions between policy formation
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and implementation, or appropriation; they aim for interpretation
rather than explanation and prediction; they question received categories; and they attempt to persuade with clear and compelling arguments while critiquing other fields’ promises to deliver “objective”
truths (for further discussion of this contrast, see Rosen, 2009). Erickson’s central argument is “that ethnography should be considered
a deliberate inquiry process guided by a point of view, rather than a
reporting process guided by a standard technique or set of techniques,
or a totally intuitive process that does not involve reflection” (1984:
51). Likewise, there is no single way to conduct the anthropology of
educational policy implementation, but such work does entail a particular lens or perspective on policy processes. As we elaborate below, this starts with questioning the conventional definitions of both
policy and practice and broadening the unit of analysis for policy implementation studies.

Defining the Social Unit for Anthropological Studies of
Educational Policy Implementation
Using Bronislaw Malinowski’s (1922) classic ethnography of a Trobriand Islands village as the exemplar, Erickson’s (1984) essay considers
how the ethnography of schooling is and is not like classic ethnography. He concludes that many general principles of classic ethnography apply readily to the ethnography of schooling, but that the specific
methods must differ because the units of analysis for the two enterprises differ in fundamental ways:
An American school is not a Trobriand village. There may
be points of analogy between the two, but there are many
points at which the analogy breaks down. For example, the
village involves the life of its members 24 hours a day over
many generations; the school does not ... But we can identify
the general principles for doing the ethnography of a primitive village [and] we can try to identify which of these general principles still apply when one turns to the ethnography
of a school — a partial community whose members (ideally)
hold achieved statuses, in which rights and obligations are
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not reciprocal, in which the goods and services exchanged
differ markedly in kind, and in which knowledge is nontraditional and rapidly changing. (1984: 53-54)
The anthropology of educational policy implementation is built
around analysis of a social unit even more amorphous than a school
(schools are at least bounded geographically). What is this unit of
analysis? To answer this question, we first consider how mainstream
(technical-rational) policy research defines the unit of analysis for education policy research, and then contrast this with how anthropological studies approach this same task.
Technical-rational studies of educational policy use an input-output model where the “treatment,” or policy, is presumed to be known,
and the main subject of concern is outcomes (e.g., test scores). Per
this framing, what the policy is is not so much in question as what the
policy does (and here too analysis is often limited to indicators related
to what the policy is supposed to do). This way of defining the unit
of analysis relies upon and takes for granted conventional definitions
of both policy and practice. According to these received notions, policies are formal institutional products (the plans formulated by officially recognized policymakers such as school board members, commissioners of education, and political leaders), while implementation,
or practice, is the activity of those charged with putting these plans
into action (such as teachers and principals). For example, elected officials make policy, while teachers and principals engage in practice.
This presumption of a clean divide between policy and practice — and
likewise between policy creators and policy enactors — naturally leads
conventional policy implementation scholars to exclude the former
half of each pair from the unit of analysis for their studies, while the
latter are often scrutinized for the fidelity of their implementation in
relation to the original design.
This way of defining the unit of analysis for educational policy
studies may appear to be commonsensical and, as such, unproblematic. However, from an anthropological perspective, it is its commonsensical nature that is precisely the problem, because the dependency
on everyday understandings of both policy and practice causes conventional studies to miss (or misconstrue) important aspects of the
policy implementation process and exclude or misrepresent key actors
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and phenomena from their analyses. Anthropological studies of policy implementation challenge the neat, common-sense distinction between policy and practice, or between policy formation and policy implementation, even while they cannot fully escape these terms and
the conventional understandings they embed. It is not that these traditional definitions are necessarily or entirely wrong — who can argue that elected officials make policy? — but rather that they are conceptually inadequate or incomplete. As sociocultural theorists remind
us, planning, or policy-making, necessarily includes doing (i.e., what
is conventionally considered practice), while implementing necessarily involves planning as well as creating, adapting, and/or (re)ordering strategies for solving problems (i.e., what is conventionally considered policy). Levinson, Sutton, and Winstead (2009) emphasize
“appropriation,” the idea that implementers can take over the determination of what gets implemented and thus that policy as practiced
cannot be understood absent this consideration. Phrased another way,
leading is not restricted to the leaders and doing is not exclusively the
province of implementers; although they do not all have the same degree of formal authority, they are all involved in a web of interconnected social activity.
However, while anthropologists of educational policy implementation challenge these conventional definitions, the subfield has not as
yet invented any new or more precise vocabulary. Consequently, anthropologically oriented policy researchers employ conventional terminology, sometimes with qualifying adjectives like “authorized policy” and “state policy” (e.g., Levinson and Sutton, 2001: 4, emphasis
added). Indeed, anthropologists often use conventional definitions as
a point of departure (see Anderson, 2009; Kendall, in press; Koyama,
2010), but also embrace an alternative, more democratic understanding of policy that blurs the neat distinction between policy and practice characteristic of conventional studies (see Levinson and Sutton,
2001, and Levinson, Sutton, and Winstead, 2009). According to this
alternative anthropological definition, educational policy is a form of
sociocultural practice that involves efforts by a range of actors with
varying degrees of formal role authority to: (1) define what is problematic in education; (2) shape interpretations and means of how
problems should be resolved; and (3) determine to what vision of the
future change efforts should be directed. This broader conception of
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policy directs attention to the social and cultural processes of interpretation, contestation, adaptation, compromise, and sometimes resistance that shape all points on what would be conventionally understood as the continuum between policy and practice. It also directs
attention to the diversity and inter-connectedness of actors involved
in these processes. This anthropological understanding of policy finds
echo in Erickson’s (1984) original piece, as Erickson acknowledges
that not all members of the partial community of school will bring the
same understanding to an issue, nor will members of the social unit
share in the ways they use and relate to the physical space in question (i.e., for Erickson, the school).
Anthropological studies of policy implementation illuminate the socially constructed nature of each of the above interrelated dimensions
of policy (problem definition, strategies of problem resolution, and
larger moral worldview). For example, such studies examine the social and cultural processes that frame why an extant reality is viewed
as problematic by those being studied (the problem diagnosis), what
strategies of action those being studied understand as available for response (i.e., the tools, vehicles, and means of social action), and what
they think a “better” outcome would look like and entail. This perspective asserts that not only policy solutions but also the purported
“problems” to which policies are ostensibly addressed are the product of social and cultural processes rather than natural or objective
“facts” (see Rosen, 2009: 276). Juxtaposing the emic and the etic, the
anthropologist endeavors to describe the various stances of actors involved in the policy implementation, but also reserves an external analytic voice. For example, Rosen (2001) shows how, as a consequence
of social processes that gave meaning to intrinsically ambiguous conditions, a local school board in the midst of California’s “math wars”
constructed the problem of mathematics achievement in the district
as one of curriculum rather than of teacher training or expertise. This
construction of the problem suited school board members’ need for
a relatively simple explanation that avoided nettlesome questions of
teacher capacity, reduced the complexity of the situation, and was
amenable to a relatively simple, technical, and cost-effective response
(regardless of whether those external to the situation would understand the response as a solution or as something else). Differentiating her own understanding from those she studied, Rosen explains
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how those engaged in math reform pursued their task and according
to what logics, but she also adds her own interpretation.
Given their broader definition of policy as a form of sociocultural
practice, the unit of analysis for anthropological studies of policy implementation is considerably broader than in conventional research
and varies from study to study, depending on the question a particular project aims to answer or explore. This means that anthropologists often include more diverse kinds of actors in their studies of
policy implementation (e.g., not only formally recognized policymakers and implementers, but also students, parents, and entities such
as professional school reform or advocacy organizations who shape
the implementation process), conceptualizing these diverse actors as
part of a larger network of interconnected activity. The determination
of whom or what should be studied is a function of the anthropologist’s analytic judgment: does considering this person help us better
understand the research question at hand and the problem diagnoses,
strategies, and senses of “what should be” that inform the policy implementation under study? From an anthropological perspective, anyone who significantly shapes one or more of the above three dimensions of policy can be considered a “policy actor,” even if they are not
an “authorized” policymaker or implementer. Moreover, adherence to
the anthropological principle of holism (the commitment to considering phenomena in relation to their social context) further requires
that anthropological studies examine the social and cultural context
(i.e., the systems of social relations, practices, ideas, beliefs, narratives, values, and understandings) that shapes and is shaped by the
implementation activity under study. For example, in Rosen’s study of
the “math wars” described above, the unit of analysis was the people,
ideas, and actions that together entailed the math reform effort; this
was bigger than just the analysis of the perspective of one or several
implementers. The idea was to position readers not just in the shoes
of the actors involved in the math wars, but also to have a more holistic understanding about those wars, one that was more expansive
than the perspective of any particular actor and which showed the relationship between this particular policy debate and the contexts that
both provoked and enfolded it.
Consequently, in anthropological studies of educational policy implementation, geographic coherence is often not a central
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consideration when drawing the analytic parameters for a study. Indeed, relevant members of the social unit of analysis may live and
work in different places, may never come in direct physical contact,
and may not even overlap chronologically in terms of when they are
involved in the policy implementation being considered. For example,
in Hamann’s (2003) study of an unlikely partnership between a private Mexican university and two Georgia school districts, “field” research was conducted in Monterrey, Mexico and Atlanta, as well as
in the two districts 90 miles from Atlanta. Policy actors included educational consultants based in Washington, DC and Mexico, Georgiabased business and school leaders, a superintendent’s secretary, several newspaper reporters, two graduate students at the University of
Massachusetts, and more than 40 teachers, about half from Georgia
and half from Mexico. All of these actors were connected in a novel effort formally intended to improve school outcomes for a rapidly growing Latino enrollment, but only some would have been traditionally
characterized as “official educational policymakers.”
Capturing this situated complexity of both understanding and action means the methods of anthropological policy studies may well
need to be multiple, various, and not as dependent on direct observation as most anthropological inquiry. The increasingly common multisite anthropological studies of globalization and population mobility
(e.g., Guerra, 1998; Ong, 1999) provide examples of how anthropologists in other subfields have dealt with this challenge. This decoupling of geographic and analytic boundaries also makes possible new
insights as a consequence of examining the exchange of ideas across
time and space. For example, Reed-Danahy’s (2003) research shows
how educational ideas and strategies are transformed as they become “supranational.” Anderson-Levitt’s (2003) book, Local Meanings,
Global Schooling, offers a number of strong chapters on how educational ideas imported from elsewhere are transformed in their conversion to local practice. So too, does Sutton and Levinson’s book (2001).
Likewise, in a discussion of civic education in Mexican secundarias
(middle schools), Levinson (2005) notes historic French, German, and
American influences that shape such a curriculum, as well as contemporary national influences as diverse as Switzerland, Argentina, and
Japan (see also Dietz and Mateos Cortes, Chapter 29, below).
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Malinowski’s (and Erickson’s) Categories of Analysis
With the unit of analysis for anthropological policy implementation
studies defined, we return to Erickson (1984), using his essay to elaborate the conceptual basis for the broader understanding of policy we
have articulated. Erickson directs much of his essay to considering the
applicability of Malinowski’s various categories of analysis — social
organization, exchange, belief systems, myth, folk philosophy, and ritual — to the ethnography of schooling. Here we do the same, applying
Malinowski’s categories to the context of educational policy implementation. Our purpose is to illustrate what an anthropological perspective offers to this domain. Malinowski’s categories may at first seem
anachronistic and to have been supplanted in contemporary studies
by the questions of power, ideology, identity, discourse, and so forth
to which Shore and Wright (1997) refer in the epigraph that starts this
chapter. For example, a chief concern of contemporary anthropological studies of educational policy implementation is how policy activity (i.e., the actions of the full range of actors described previously)
both shapes and is shaped by systemic inequalities related to gender,
social class, and race: such as how educational policy in the United
States reflects and reinforces belief in meritocracy and individual effort as the route to social mobility and how this helps reproduce such
systemic inequalities. However, the distance between these older and
newer sets of analytic categories may not be as vast as it first appears.
Underlying each is an enduring concern with the problem of social
order, especially the construction, maintenance, and function of systems of social relations, thought, and belief Consequently, while the
study of power has become more overt and purposeful (Nader, 1972)
and there have been other important theoretical developments since
Malinowski, his categories suit our purpose because they represent
the conceptual building blocks and long-standing concerns of the field.
The first category Erickson considers, social organization, may
fit the anthropology of educational policy implementation even better than the ethnography of schooling. Erickson writes, “As a way of
thinking about the school as a small community, we could apply to it
the fundamental terms of discourse about social organization — person, status, role, rights, obligations — taking very little for granted initially” (1984: 54). Processes of educational policy implementation also
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link people, invoking statuses and roles with attendant rights and obligations. For example, a study by Hamann and Lane (2004) focused
on state department of education employees in Puerto Rico and Maine,
who were intermediaries in the process of converting the federal Comprehensive School Reform Demonstration (CSRD) process into actual
school practice. In this instance, the people being studied were defined by their status in the hierarchy between federal resources and
local practice and their roles as professional educational bureaucrats
(as opposed to other roles these people no doubt played in other facets
of their lives, like spouse, parent, sports fan, etc.). They “performed”
their status in part by direct and indirect interaction with those of
other statuses (e.g., organizing professional development workshops
for funded schools, or attending US Department of Education workshops) and through this performance helped reshape what the policy was “as delivered” - making CSRD a “high school-only” initiative in Maine, for example, or supporting the inclusion of the Puerto
Rico State Systemic Initiative (PRSSI) as an authorized whole-school
change model, even though until that point it was mainly a science education reform strategy. By paying attention to the social organization
of policy implementation, the researchers found and studied a source
of policy development that would have been neither identified nor analyzed in a traditional study because the individuals in question were
not official policymakers. However, their roles as intermediaries gave
them substantial influence over the implementation of federal policy.
Erickson next recounts Malinowski’s analysis of social behavior as
a form of exchange, in which individuals trade unlike goods (emphasis in Erickson, 1984: 54). To illustrate such relations and practices
at school, Erickson describes students exchanging deference to their
teachers for kind treatment. In educational policy implementation, we
might identify the exchange of extra attention and resources from a
curriculum developer with a site willing to pilot its curriculum. For example, the developers of the AVID high school reform model exchange
high levels of their own professional assistance to pilot school sites
that are willing to implement their school improvement model, but
also be extensively documented (Datnow, Hubbard, and Mehan, 2002;
Mehan et al., 1996). In the study of educational policy implementation, the anthropologist needs to explain the diverse motivations and
interests driving different categories of actors (such as designers of a
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school reform model as compared with educators at prospective implementation sites) to participate in policy implementation. AVID designers needed pilot sites to test and refine their ideas about how to
improve high schools for a broader range of students. For personnel
at prospective pilot sites, external scrutiny (which could reveal that
not all students are being well served) might be a turn off to participation. However, the prospect of extra resources, expert guidance,
and “help” entailed in AVID’s offer to support a reform effort might
be enough to overcome scrutiny-related reluctance. Model developers and site personnel do not need to fully agree on the problem to be
solved, nor on the strategies of implementation, to cooperate on implementation. Exchange then explains a reason for the collaboration
across difference that is intrinsic to policy implementation.
Malinowski and Erickson’s third category is belief systems, which
Erickson subtitles “Religion, Folk Philosophy, and Ritual.” Erickson
explains: “The school can be seen as having a worldview or ideology
... grounded in folk philosophy whose elements are: terms of definition, principles of valuation, rules of logic, methods of explanation for
cause, and forms of predictive statements” (1984: 55). It is not difficult to identify such elements in educational policy implementation as
well. Labels that describe various kinds of students — for example, the
racial/ethnic, language status, socioeconomic, and special education
labels formalized as data categories in the United States’ No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB) and elsewhere — clearly act as terms of definition
with clear implications for placement, assessment, and other interaction. NCLB and the recent standards movement can readily be understood as embedding principles of valuation (what knowledge matters in each of the disciplines, which disciplines should be covered in
“high stakes testing,” etc.) and reflecting key articles of cultural faith,
especially belief in the possibility — via science and evidence-based
practice — of obtaining unambiguous knowledge about educational
processes and controlling educational outcomes via technical-rational policy activity. Indeed, the latter is a fundamental belief underlying nearly all formal educational policy activity (see Rosen, 2009).
The policy implementation process also embeds various rules of
logic — for example, that textbooks should be a source of curriculum
content, that classrooms should be led by a single educator instead of
teacher teams, or that school funding should be supported by a hybrid
of local, state, and federal revenues (the norm in the United States)
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or just by the federal government (as is common in Mexico and many
other countries). Heath (1983) writes memorably about the language
development “logic” of early elementary education in the late 1970s
US South, where the reading curriculum was ordered from phonetics, to grammar, to creative composition (and thus failed to be immediately responsive to the working-class Mexican American children
of the neighborhood of Trackton, who had been socialized in an environment that prized creative exaggeration). In other words, the logic
of curriculum policy implementation in that instance seemed so “logical” and unexceptional that its poor fit for a whole segment of students was unrecognized. Rules of logic impede other ways of thinking
about how policy should be implemented; they define a normal way
of operating. Finally, it is easy to identify predictive premises in policy implementation efforts. Indeed, that is the point of formal policy
implementation: The belief is if x strategies are pursued, y new social reality will ensue.
While one could argue that myth — Malinowski’s fourth category
— is a kind of belief system (his third category), to stay true to Malinowski and Erickson’s taxonomy, we consider myth as a fourth category here. Erickson offers examples of myths that are common in
American curricular content (e.g., “Creation Myths: The Coming of
the Pilgrims, The Revolutionary War, The Opening of the West, The
Civil War, The Rise in the Standard of Living” (1984: 55, capitalizations original). Anthropologists use the concept of myth to indicate
socially constructed narratives that give meaning and order to human
experience by providing relatively simple and reassuring explanations
for ambiguous, complex, and/or troubling circumstances. These stories often reflect, validate, and reinforce a society’s “sacred beliefs”:
those cherished ideals and values that are accepted without question
and taken on faith, such as the American achievement ideology and
the faith in science and rational policy activity previously noted. Although in popular usage myth implies falsehood, the central consideration in the anthropological analysis of myth is not a question of empirical accuracy per se, but rather how such stories function to help
individuals make sense of social conditions and justify particular actions. As such, the concept of myth reflects a particular stance on reality itself: the premise that reality is intrinsically ambiguous and all
explanations of it are necessarily selective and incomplete (see Rosen,
2001, 2009).
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In our work with schools, we have both encountered the myth,
or story, of the old man on the morning beach who was methodically
throwing one starfish after the next back into the surf, lest they be
stranded above the tide line and die of dehydration. Confronted by
a younger person who tells the old man that what he is doing does
not matter, that he cannot possibly save all the stranded starfish, the
old man looks at the starfish in his hand (about to be rescued) and
says, “It matters to this one.” A version of this story was repeated on
a poster that hung in the Center for Urban Ethnography at the University of Pennsylvania’s Graduate School of Education in the mid1990s. Nebraska’s long-time Commissioner of Education, Doug Christiansen, who retired in 2008, used to wear a gold starfish on his lapel
and distribute similar starfish pins to educators across the state with
the purpose of invoking this story. In both settings, the message and
analogy to education was overt: our efforts matter to this one. It is
easy to see this as a “feel-good” myth, one that recommits us to making sure schooling matters for one child, if only that one. But it is also
useful to see how this myth steers thought patterns and conceptualizations of what is possible. Subtly, this myth challenges another —
that all students can reasonably be expected to achieve to high standards — as it concedes that most starfish will not make it. As such, it
expresses the tacit acceptance of inequality that is a fundamental element of capitalist societies. It frames starfish, and students, as without
agency (they need to be rescued). And, reflecting the atomistic view
of social order that goes along with US individualism, it celebrates individual quixotic effort (the old man’s efforts are better than doing
nothing), but in so doing steers away from a more systemic critique
or solution: why are so many starfish imperiled?; what systemic solution could improve the fates of more of them? Returning overtly to
the elements of policy and policy implementation, this myth defines
the problem (vulnerable starfish), celebrates a strategy of response
(the heroic rescue of at least a few starfish by a single old man), and
defines a “better” social reality (in which not quite so many vulnerable starfish perish).
Of course, myths are not policies by either the conventional understanding of policy or the adapted one that emerges from the anthropology of educational policy implementation. But there is a structural parallel and an intertwining between myth (as anthropologically
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understood) and both what comes to pass educationally and how it is
understood by those linked across a hierarchical policy implementation process. Myth may provide a key “glue” that aligns both efforts
and rationales of those who are differently situated in relation to implementation. When the Commissioner repeats the starfish rescue
story at a state conference and an attending principal and teacher
both nod in assent, that solidarity informs how more concrete suggestions for practice are heard and responded to. It may suggest that
Commissioner and school-based practitioner alike see extra individual effort by educators (akin to the old man) and exceptional successful outcomes for at least a few (akin to the rescued starfish) as at least
part of what successful implementation should look like. In that sense,
myth gets inexorably incorporated into policy as practice.
Erickson returns to folk philosophy as the fifth of Malinowski’s categories that he considers. He writes, “The varying folk philosophies
(metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics) inherent in teacher culture,
administrator culture, and student culture may provide cultural lenses
through which the same events look different” (1984: 55). He then
goes on to suggest that folk philosophic systems are composed of three
elements: basic terms, relations between basic terms (which he calls
“basic premises”), and relations between terms and premises that are
manifest in statements of correlation/probability, causal explanation,
and prediction. The anthropology of educational policy implementation could readily use the same taxonomy, identifying teachers’ and
administrators’ use of basic terms, like “adolescent literacy,” “gradelevel,” and “reader” to build a basic premise such as: secondary school
students who are behind grade level need intentional educational interventions that are describable within a category called adolescent
literacy. In turn, the belief systems of implementers of such a program
could be examined to see if they concurred with the causal explanation of literacy as a missing educational component or the prediction
that overtly attending to it would remedy the identified problem. In
this example, the folk philosophies of various kinds of stakeholders
could be juxtaposed. Presumably, secondary-school students targeted
by such an initiative might dislike the premise that they needed a literacy program since, to them, that basic term would invite a range
of unpalatable connotations about academic weaknesses. Similarly,
private schools with partially public enrollments (common in parts
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of New England) might resist offering adolescent literacy initiatives,
fearing that literacy education at the secondary level would suggest
that they have academically weak students rather than strong ones.
Yet certain teachers might gravitate to this premise, finding it an apt
explanation for a range of students’ struggles that they have witnessed
and tried to attend to in their careers (Hamann and Meltzer, 2005).
As with myth, folk philosophy can become implicated in policy
implementation through purposeful application. Folk philosophies
(which can vary widely and change over time) are in Erickson’s rendering variable yet enduring characteristics of educational systems.
As such, folk philosophies become building blocks not only for educational policy implementation (informing problem diagnoses, strategies, and the sense of “what should be”), but also for routine practice.
So it is the task of the anthropologist of educational policy implementation to determine whether examining educators’ invocation of folk
philosophies is helpful for understanding the process of implementation in a particular case. As Erickson notes, part of the anthropologist’s work is to interpret — to reduce complex intertwining practices
and imperatives into an intelligible and, ideally, illuminating account.
Often, identifying the folk philosophies that inform implementation
serves as a useful interpretive move.
The sixth Malinowskian category Erickson directs us to is ritual.
Rituals generally consist of stylized or formalized activity that, by
means of predictable scripts for behavior, help produce and maintain
social order, conveying symbolic messages that reinforce sacred beliefs, legitimate existing social arrangements, and help manufacture or
elicit feelings of social solidarity and individual belonging to a larger
collective. Erickson offers recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance and
the awarding of varsity athletic letters as examples of rituals. Policy
implementation can also be viewed through this lens. Symbolic activities such as myth and ritual often involve a degree of what critical
theorists call mystification: symbolic representation of the social order in ways that differ systematically from the reality on the ground.
For example, at their most fundamental level, many of the activities
that comprise formal policy-making can be understood as symbolic
reassurances that our idealized beliefs about how government works
(e.g., government of, by, and for the people) are actually true. Thus,
even when policy events serve little instrumental function (such as
when public hearings on this or that issue have little actual bearing
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on policy decisions), they nonetheless perform the important expressive function of validating this core belief (see Rosen, 2001, 2009).

Ensuring the Reliability and Validity of Anthropological Policy
Studies
Of course, schools are more than the sum of social organization, quasieconomic exchanges, belief systems, myths, folk philosophies, and rituals. Moreover, as Erickson notes, by calling outsize attention to facets of the quotidian, anthropologists invariably distort social realities
(1984: 58). Details are left out, so that readers can concentrate on the
ones the anthropologist hopes to draw attention to. Invariably, these
decisions, however expert and defensible, represent a point of view.
The anthropologist chooses to offer this depiction of the social reality
that he or she recorded, instead of the myriad other depictions that
would have been possible. So too does the anthropological analysis
of educational policy reflect the point of view of the anthropologist,
drawing attention to certain facets of the policy implementation under
study and thereby steering attention away from other aspects. As critical realists would note, all research arguably involves such processes
of selection, representation, and thus inevitable distortion, but anthropological studies — whether school ethnographies or policy analyses
— are particularly vulnerable to charges of bias because of their reliance on the individual anthropologist’s powers of interpretation and,
in Erickson’s view, the lack of explicit “rules of evidence” for evaluating their validity. To protect against such charges, Erickson suggests
six questions that he argues should be asked of every ethnography:
How did you arrive at your overall point of view?
What did you leave out and what did you leave in?
What was your rationale for selection?
From the universe of behavior available to you, how much
did you monitor?
Why did you monitor behavior in some situations and not
in others?
What grounds do you have for determining meaning from
the actors’ point of view? (1984: 58–59)
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These same questions suggest a framework for evaluating and
strengthening the validity of anthropologically oriented policy studies as well. They ask the researcher to make his or her point of view
overt, present the evidence grounding assertions of emic (and etic)
viewpoints, and reflect explicitly on the processes of selection and interpretation that inevitably shaped the study:
I believe that a good ethnography should not only be able to
answer those questions, but should provide data to illustrate
the decisions made during the research process ... In other
words, the ethnographer should provide readers with guidelines for the falsification of the analysis, should a reader decide to replicate the study ... The positivists have a point. Although I may object to their particular rules of evidence, I
am forced to admit that some systematic rules of evidence
are necessary. (1984: 59)
Erickson then offers some rules of evidence for school ethnography, several of which would clearly also apply to the anthropology of
educational policy implementation. For example, he notes that schools
are embedded in larger social systems (just as educational policy implementation is embedded in larger social and policy universes), and
invariably that means that more data could hypothetically be collected
than is realistic or feasible. This requires explicit strategies for “eliminating some of the welter of information” (1984: 60). These include
explaining how the social unit of analysis came to be defined and
bounded, how the sample was selected, how researchable questions
were identified and operationalized, and how holism (the anthropological commitment to considering phenomena in relation to their social context), though necessarily checked, was not abandoned.
As part of this consideration of rules of evidence, Erickson takes
on the core tool of anthropological analysis — the anthropologist —
and emphasizes that tool’s invariable subjectivity. In so doing, he also
suggests a key criterion for evaluating the quality of ethnographic or
anthropological studies: the researcher’s clarity in communicating his
or her particular point of view as a subject.
It was I who was there doing the fieldwork, not somebody
else. My fundamental assumptions and prejudices are part
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of my me. I cannot leave them at home when I enter a site.
I must study a place as me ... The desirable goal is not the
impossible one of my disembodied objectivity (I am a subject, not an object) but of clarity in communicating my point
of view as a subject, both to myself and to my audience. In
addition to being me to my audience, as an ethnographer
I have an obligation to have been there. Really being there
means experiencing strong relationships with whomever else
is there (one’s informants). Some of these relationships may
feel good and others may hurt ... [I]t is not involvement at
arm’s length.” (1984: 60–61, emphasis original)
It follows that in an anthropology of educational policy implementation, the anthropologist needs to name who he or she was in relation
to the policy implementation under examination. In Hamann’s (2003)
work in Georgia, that includes documenting a role of exchanging successful Title VII grant-writing (for US$500,000, for Systemwide Bilingual Education) for access to a demographically fast-changing school
district that was partnering with a Mexican university to negotiate
that change, and for which the US$500,000 grant was one of several
important funding sources. That grant-writing role was informed by a
sense of what should be (which was proposed in the grant), and meant
access to certain individuals (the leaders of the binational partnership)
more than others (e.g., the newcomer immigrant students for whom
the partnership was ostensibly created). The reason this account of a
multifaceted partnership could be shared was because the researcher
was there, and the way it was shared, in turn, reflects who that researcher was (subjectively) as well as what he saw and paid attention
to or may have missed.
Yet that account of educational policy creation and implementation in Georgia required not just documenting who the anthropologist
was in relation to the data collection and analysis task (as important
as those are). As Erickson consistently implies, there is a there that
the anthropologist is trying to chronicle and the anthropologist’s account is not just a product of point of view, but also of what was there
to be seen. Complementing Erickson’s recommendations related to anthropological evidence, we thus also think it important that anthropological renderings of educational policy implementation account for
what Maxwell (1992) has characterized as the validity of qualitative
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data. Acknowledging that educational research, including anthropological research, is intrinsically interested should not stop anthropologists from trying to make accurate accounts of what transpired and
how what transpired is/was understood.
As with the terms “policy” and “practice,” anthropologists face dilemmas when using a term like validity, which has such ingrained and
common usage in more positivistic domains of educational research.
Yet Maxwell (1992) asserts that this term can be used to consider data
like that which anthropologists of education and educational policy
implementation would normally collect, because we can ask about
the correspondence between what was collected/measured and what
could have been collected/measured. In Maxwell’s rendering, there are
five levels of validity that can be considered in qualitative research:
descriptive, interpretive, theoretical, generalizability, and evaluative.
These five offer an additional taxonomy that can both guide anthropologists of educational policy implementation as well as those who
read such anthropologists’ accounts.
Descriptive validity refers to factual assertions made by the researcher. If a researcher records that Malawi received money to expand primary education (Kendall, in press), then a descriptive validity
check would ask, “Did it?” What’s the proof of such a transfer? Interpretive validity refers to the accurate portrayal of the interpretations
of those under study. As an interpretive validity check, if an anthropologist asserted that most teachers in a site expressed skepticism of
No Child Left Behind, then the checker can examine the evidence for
such a claim (e.g., recorded frequent complaints about this act in faculty lounge teacher conversations).
The remaining three types of validity differ from the first two in
that they are not “experience near” (Maxwell, citing Geertz [1974],
1992: 291), but rather characterize the researcher’s assertions. As an
example of theoretical assertion, Maxwell suggests a researcher understanding a student’s throwing of an eraser as an act of resistance.
In turn, the validity check for such an assertion would be an examination of the supporting evidence for that claim: Did the student have
reason to resist?; Is it a reasonable understanding of the classroom environment to assert that eraser throwing would not be welcome?; and
so on. Generalizability refers to “the extent to which one can extend
the account of a particular situation or population to other persons,
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times, or settings, than those directly studied” (1992: 293). Anderson
(2009) tries to expand the generalizability of her account by comparing her fieldwork on the politics of language education in California
in the mid-1990s to her view on the politics of language education
in Georgia where she has lived and worked subsequently. Her claim
for the broader relevance, or generalizability, of her studies in California to other sites is advanced by her invoking the different case of
Georgia. If readers agree that lessons from California are relevant to
Georgia (and/or vice versa), then Anderson’s quest for generalizability is advanced. Indeed, per the logic of maximum variation sampling
(Patton, 1990), if Anderson can highlight both how different California and Georgia are and, yet, how the case of one is still relevant to
the other, then her quest for generalizability is advanced even further. Evaluative validity measures the aptness of applications of evaluative frameworks.
Evaluative frameworks in this instance refer to overtly subjective
judgments on the part of the researcher. So if a researcher claims that
a policy was unjust or mean, the validity check would examine the evidence in relation to a broader understanding of what constitutes injustice or meanness. Given contemporary interest on the part of many
anthropologists of education to question the justice of educational policy implementation (e.g., Abu el-Raj, 2006; Gilmore, 2008; LadsonBillings, 2006; Lomawaima and McCarty, 2006), successful assertion
of evaluative validity becomes an important concern.

A Heuristic for Future Studies
Using and adapting Erickson (1984) and adding Maxwell (1992), we
have attempted not simply to define the anthropology of educational
policy implementation, but also to offer a heuristic that can guide novice or aspiring contributors to the field. Specifically, we propose that
anthropological studies of educational policy implementation should
aim to accomplish particular analytic ends. First, they should make
explicit the social unit of analysis and the rationale for how the anthropologist has drawn its boundaries: what is/are the educational
policy(ies) whose implementation is being investigated?; what are
the constituent pieces in terms of problem diagnosis, strategies of
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resolution, and sense of what should be that are embedded in that
policy?; who are the actors the anthropologist has chosen to include
in the analysis and why? Second, they should overtly address the tension in how they understand policy versus how it is conventionally understood (a step that will likely be necessary until anthropology has
a larger, better recognized role in educational policy implementation
studies, and/or it has invented new technical terms to distinguish its
conception of policy from the conventional definition). Third, they
should illuminate, from both emic and etic perspectives, the chain of
human relationships that is created through the implementation of
a formal or informal educational policy. This includes shedding light
on the social and cultural processes in which policies are implicated
— an analytic task for which Malinowski’s categories of social organization, exchange, belief systems, myth, folk philosophy, and ritual
can provide a useful rubric or frame. In so doing, they should examine
the prevailing understandings and intentions informing policy activity. Finally, anthropologists should explicitly acknowledge the intrinsic distortion that is the inevitable product of their research writeup and their stance (what Erickson refers to as “point of view”), and
still provide readers grounds for evaluating the validity of their account (per Maxwell).
Traditional educational policy studies too readily ignore important
dynamics that can broadly explain both how educational systems operate and why they yield the outcomes they do. By contrast, sociocultural approaches capture and highlight important data that these traditional studies miss. Fortunately, it is steadily becoming more widely
recognized that anthropological approaches have a keen role to play in
the study of educational policy implementation (whether the anthropological approach is overtly noted or not). And only through more
nuanced and thorough understandings of what is happening can we
make informed choices about how to generate more favorable practices and outcomes.
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